Self-made	People DAVID	MARK	KOVACS Bilkent	University [my	name,	separated	with	dots]@gmail.edu [Penultimate	draft;	please	cite	the	official	version!] Abstract:	The	Problem	of	Overlappers is	a	puzzle	about	what	makes it the	case, and	how	we	can	know,	that	we	have	the	parts	we	intuitively	think	we	have.	In	this paper,	I	develop	and	motivate	an	overlooked	solution	to	this	puzzle.	According	to what I call the self-making view it is	within certain constraints in our	power to decide	what	we	refer	to	with	the	personal	pronoun	'I',	so	the	truth	of	most	of	our beliefs	about	our	parts	is	ensured	by	the	very	mechanism	of	self-reference.	Other than	providing an elegant solution to the	Problem	of	Overlappers, the view can also be motivated on independent grounds. It also has wide-ranging consequences	for	how	we	should	be	thinking	about	persons.	Among	other	things, it	can	help	undermine	an	influential	line	of	argument	against	the	permissibility	of elective amputation. After a detailed discussion and defence of the self-making view,	I	consider	some	objections	to	it.	I	conclude	that	none	of	these	objections	is persuasive	and	we	should	at	the	very	least	take	seriously	the	idea	that	we	are	to some	extent	self-made. 1.	Overpopulation	puzzles	and	the	metaphysics	of	persons I am a person: a conscious, rational, thinking being. I also have various parts: feet, hands, nose, ears, and so on.	Moreover, I have parts that are or involve	my 'thinking parts':	brain,	head,	and	things	without	a	conventional	name	in	English,	for	example	my 'nose-complement'	(a	part that includes	all	of	me	except for	my	nose).	For	the	sake	of vividness, focus on my nose-complement. My nose-complement has everything intrinsically	required	for	personhood:	it	has	a	working	brain	with	the	capacity	to	sustain a	complex	mental	life.	Worse	yet,	it	has	my	brain,	which	makes	it	an	excellent	candidate for	thinking	just	what	I	think.	But	if	my	nose-complement	thinks	of	itself	what	I	think	of myself,	it	is	badly	mistaken.	It	is	plausibly	not	a	person,	and	it	certainly	does	not	have	a nose.	Unfortunately,	things	seem	to	my	nose-complement	exactly	the	way	they	seem	to me.	What	makes	it	the	case,	then,	that	in	referring	to	myself	I	refer	to	a	person	and	not to a nose-complement? And how can I know that I am a person and not a nosecomplement? This is one of the	many overpopulation puzzles	widely discussed in the personal identity literature. However, my cursory presentation lumped together two different problems	that	ought	to	be	distinguished.	For	clarity's	sake,	let	me	introduce	some	fresh terminology	for	them.	The	first	problem	I	shall	call	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons.	Here, we	assume	at	the	outset	that	even	if	our	large	composite	proper	parts	are	very	similar to	persons,	they	nevertheless	fail	to	be	persons.	This	does	not	automatically	answer	the following question:	What	makes it the case that	when I use the	word 'I', I refer to a 2 person?	I	put	the	question	in	linguistic	terms,	but	there	is	an	equally	pressing	question about	'I'-thoughts.	If	I	share	my	place	with	highly	person-like	entities	that	ultimately	fail to	be	persons,	then	what	makes	it	the	case	that	my	'I'-thoughts	pick	out	a	person,	rather than any of these non-persons? These questions have a distinctively metaphysical flavour,	but	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons	also	has	an	epistemological	side:	how	can	I know	that	I	am	a	person?	Whatever	reasons	I	could	cite	for	thinking	that	I	am	a	person, are also available to the	non-persons overlapping	with	me.	But if they think they are persons, they are	wrong. And since I have no rational basis to tell	myself apart from them,	apparently	I	cannot	know	that	I	am	a	person. The	second	problem,	which	we	could	call the	Problem	of	Overlappers, requires	no specific	assumption	about	personhood.	Never	mind	if	my	nose-complement	is	a	person. I firmly believe that I am not a nose-complement; I have the boundaries of a human being and not those of a proper part of a human being. To borrow a pair of useful expressions from	Madden	(forthcoming), I	am	a	humanoid, something that	has	human form.	When	I	refer	to	myself	and	entertain	various	beliefs	about	what	parts	I	have,	these are normally true beliefs about a humanoid, not false beliefs about something that overlaps	with a humanoid (an overlapper, to borrow another handy expression from Madden).	For	instance,	when	I	utter	the	sentence	'I	have	a	nose'	and	think	the	thought expressed	by	it,	I	say	and	think	something	true	about	a	humanoid;	I	do	not	say	and	think something false	about	a	nose-complement.	But	why is this so?	This	puzzle too	has	an equally pressing epistemological aspect. If I think I have a nose and my nosecomplement	thinks	that	it	has	a	nose,	one	of	us	is	mistaken.	But	how	can	I	know	that	I am	not	the	one	who	is	mistaken?	More	generally:	how	can	I	know	that	I	have	roughly the	parts	I	think	I	have	and	am	not	an	overlapper	with	a	different	set	of	parts?1 The two problems are often discussed together, but they importantly differ: the Problem of Overlappers is about our parts, while the Problem of Almost-Persons is about	our	status	as	persons.	Despite	this	difference,	the	two	problems	are	importantly related	in	the	following	way.	One	may	reasonably	suppose	that	no	acceptable	solution	to the	Problem	of	Overlappers	can	deny	that	we	are	persons;	it	cannot	turn	out	that	when self-referring, some of us refer to non-persons. Call this the Person Constraint. The Person Constraint is highly plausible and suggests that the two problems are best approached together.	To	recap, this	means that	we	need to	answer the following four questions: (a) what makes it the case that our 'I'-thoughts and utterances pick out persons?	(b)	How	can	we	know	that	they	pick	out	persons?	(c)	What	makes	it	the	case that they typically pick out things	with roughly the parts that	we think	we	have? (d) How can	we	normally know that they	pick out things	with roughly the	parts that	we think	we	have?	The rest of this paper	will focus	mostly on questions (c) and (d), the 1	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	is	more	or less	what	Madden	(forthcoming)	calls	the	problem	of	thinking parts. I	still	prefer	my	terminology	because	Madden's label	suggests	that	when	self-referring	we	always pick	out	the	largest	candidate,	which	has	all	the	other	candidates	as	proper	parts.	As	should	be	obvious from	the	discussion to follow, I	believe this	assumption to	be false.	For	more	on these	puzzles, see	van Inwagen 1981, Olson 1995, 2007, Merricks 1998, Hawley 1998, Sider 2001b, 2003, Burke 2003, Zimmerman	2003a,	Hershenov	2005,	Hudson	2007,	D.	Kovacs	2010,	and	Sutton	2014. 3 metaphysical and the epistemological aspects of the Problem of Overlappers. But in some detail it will be necessary to also discuss the Problem of Almost-Persons. The reasons	for	this	are	two.	First,	I	want	to	show	that	there	is	a	unified	solution	to	the	two problems.	Second,	I	want	to	show	that	while	my	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers is	quite	unorthodox,	it	honours	the	Person	Constraint. The two problems also share an important common feature: they make no assumption	about	uniqueness	or	referential indeterminacy.	As I stated them,	both	are concerned	with	why	we	are, and	how	we can	know that	we	are, entities	with certain features.	They	assume	neither that	exactly	one	person-candidate is	a	person,	nor that every	token	of	'I'	determinately	refers	to	one	person-candidate.	This	is	no	accident.	The Problem of Almost-Persons and the Problem of Overlappers are puzzles about selfreference	and	as	such	are	specific	to	conscious,	rational,	thinking	beings.	But	there	is	a completely general	puzzle,	Unger's (1980) famous	Problem	of the	Many,	which	arises for all	material objects, including persons.2 It is not entirely uncontroversial	what the problem	exactly	is,	but	the	phenomenon	of	boundary-vagueness	plays	a	central	role	in it.	Take,	for	instance,	any	ordinary	chair.	It	is	not	clear	where	the	boundaries	of	the	chair are:	there	are	mereological	sums	that	do	and	largely	overlapping	sums	that	do	not	have certain	particles	around	the	outskirts	of	the	chair.	What	prevents	all	those	mereological sums	from	being	chairs?	And	even	if	exactly	one	of	them	is	a	chair,	which	one	is	that?	At least	in	part,	this	is	a	problem	about	referential	indeterminacy:	we	intuitively	think	that when	attempting	to	refer	to	a	material	object	of	kind	K	we	determinately	refer	to	exactly one	K;	moreover,	we	take	ourselves	to	know	which	K	we	are	referring	to.	The	Problem of the Many threatens to show otherwise. It is important to make it clear that the Problem	of	Overlappers	and	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons	do	not	concern	boundaryvagueness,	and they threaten	not	with	referential indeterminacy	but	with	widespread and	massive	error.	In	the	actual	world,	where	boundary-vagueness	is	rampant,	it	is	easy to	mistake these	problems for a special instance	of the	Problem	of the	Many.	But the problems	differ	both	in	source	and	in	scope	and	should	not	be	confused.3 The	rest	of	the	paper	will	proceed	as	follows.	In	section	2	I	will	present	two	general approaches to the problems: deflationist and heavyweight views. In section 3, I will introduce	my	preferred	variety	of	deflationism, the self-making	view: roughly, our 'I'thoughts and utterances automatically pick out the best candidate referent in our vicinity.	The	view	borrows	a	familiar	idea	from	Harold	Noonan	(1998):	when	using	the word	'I'	only	persons	refer	to	themselves,	while	non-persons	refer	to	the	persons	they overlap with. As we shall see, the self-making view provides a nice solution to the 2	See	especially	Hudson	2001:	Ch.	1–2. 3 The two problems should also be distinguished from overpopulation puzzles that have to do with coincident, rather than	merely	overlapping,	person-candidates: the	Problem	of the	Thinking	Animal for non-animalist	theories	of	personal	identity	and	the	"revenge	problems"	that	target	animalism.	For	these puzzles, see Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997a, Noonan 1998, Shoemaker 1999, Baker 2000: 207–208, Robinson 2006: 255–8, Johnston 2007, Árnadóttir 2010, and Parfit 2012. Unlike these puzzles, the Problem of Overlappers and the Problem of Almost-Persons arise for any metaphysic of persons according	to	which	we	have	"thinking	parts". 4 Problem	of	Overlappers	but	can	also	be	motivated	by	independent	considerations	about demonstratives and	mental content. It also has some surprising (though to	my	mind attractive) consequences, which will be spelled out in section 4. In section 5 I will address	several	objections.	I	will	argue	that	none	of	them	are	compelling,	and	we	should treat the self-making view as a serious and largely overlooked competitor in the metaphysics	of	persons. 2.	Two	approaches	to	the	puzzles How should we go about solving the puzzles? Two broad strategies recommend themselves. (The literature rarely distinguishes between the Problem of AlmostPersons	and	the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	and	in	presenting	the	two	strategies	I	will	not pay	too	much	attention	to	the	distinction	either.	I	will	be	more	careful	when	presenting my	own	view.) Heavyweight approaches attempt to find some metaphysically significant feature that	distinguishes	persons from	their	overlappers.	The feature	most	obviously	coming to	mind	is	existence:	perhaps	the	problematic	parts	do	not	even	exist.	One	may	get	rid	of nose-complements	and	their	kin	by	rejecting	the	Remainder	Principle	(RP),	according	to which for	any	x and	y, if	x is a	proper	part	of	y then there is a	z composed	exactly	of those	parts	of	y that	do	not	overlap	x (Simons	1987,	p.	88).	But in itself, this	will	not solve the puzzles; one would also need to eliminate composite proper parts whose existence	is	independently	plausible,	such	as	brains,	heads	and	upper	parts	(those	that sculptors	represent	with	a	bust).4 An	alternative	heavyweight	strategy	is	to	accept	the existence	of	overlappers	but	maintain that they lack	some intrinsic	property required for personhood. Perhaps a thing's mental properties do not supervene on the microphysical	properties	of its	parts,	so	our	overlappers	do	not intrinsically	qualify	as persons (Merricks 1998). Or perhaps their parts lack certain natural functions necessary	for	personhood	(Madden	forthcoming).	Either	way,	heavyweight	approaches contend that the problematic person-candidates do not enjoy our metaphysically distinguished	status. By	contrast,	deflationist	approaches	posit	no	deep	metaphysical	difference	between us	and	our	overlappers	and	suggest	instead	that	some	general	facts	about	the	workings of	thought	and	language	guarantee	that	when	self-referring,	we	refer	to	things	with	the right	parts.	These	views	are	naturally	paired	with	a	more	general	deflationist	attitude	to the metaphysics of persons: the underlying thought is that most philosophical questions	about	people	are	primarily	conceptual	questions.5	This	does	not	necessarily mean	that	the	traditional	puzzles	surrounding	persons	are	philosophically	unimportant. Sider, for	example,	argues that the	problem	of	personal identity is 'conceptually	deep, even	if	metaphysically	shallow'	(2011,	p.	74):	theorizing	about	persons	may	shed	light 4	For	this	reason,	Olson	(1995)	concludes	that	we	have	no	composite	proper	parts	at	all. 5	I	am	deliberately	being	somewhat	vague	here,	since	the	view	comes	in	so	many	different	versions.	See, among others, Lewis 1976, Nozick 1981, Hirsch 1982: Ch. 10, Parfit 1984, Unger 1990, Rovane 1998, Sidelle	1999,	Sider	2001a,	and	Eklund	2004. 5 on	crucial	concepts	like	deliberation	and	moral	responsibility	but	will	not	reveal	much about	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world.6 As of today, the most popular deflationist view about personal identity is conventionalism. A natural conventionalist approach to overpopulation puzzles	would be	that	something	about	the	meaning	of	the	predicate	'is	a	person'	guarantees	that	our self-referential attempts latch	on to things	with the features	we	normally attribute to them. A thoroughly public version of conventionalism would emphasize the role of social conventions. For instance, perhaps personhood is a maximal concept: the predicate	'is	a	person'	is	not	applicable	to	proper	parts	of	persons.7	A	different	kind	of conventionalism may allow that different speakers have slightly different concepts corresponding	to	the	same	linguistic	expression.8	Both	kinds	of	conventionalism	should be distinguished from a much more radical view, according to which persons are conventional constructs that depend for their existence on social conventions.9 Conventionalism	as	I	understand	it	makes	no	such	claim.	It	contends	merely	that	it	is	a matter of convention which mind-independently existing things count as persons; which	things	exists	is	not	(cf.	Olson	1997b,	pp.	156–9	and	Merricks	2001,	p.	175). In this paper, I will not discuss the standard versions of deflationism, nor will I criticize their	heavyweight	alternatives. Instead, I	wish to	propose	a	novel	deflationist view	and	argue	that	we	have	reasons	to	take	it	seriously.	According	to	the	picture	I	shall advocate,	we are partially self-made. By the claim that	we are self-made I only	mean something	analogous	to	the	social	conventionalist	view:	within	some	yet	to	be	specified constraints	it	is	up	to	us	what	we	refer	to	with	the	personal	pronoun	'I',	but	it	is	not	up to	us	what	exists	or	what	is	a	candidate	referent	of	our	use	of	'I'.	The	self-making	view, as	I	shall	call	it,	yields	a	nice	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers:	when	I	think	that	I have	a	leg,	my	belief	is	automatically	true	because	for	any	candidate	referent	that	lacks	a leg,	there	is	a	better	candidate	that	has	one.	The	view	is	in	part	inspired	by,	and	works best	in	tandem	with,	a	theory	of	Harold	Noonan's	(1998)	that	has	come	to	be	known	as Personal	Pronoun	Revisionism	(PPR).	(I	adopt	this	name	with	some	hesitation,	since	it is not obvious that the view is genuinely revisionary in character.) According to PPR, only	persons	can	use	the	word	'I'	to	refer	to	themselves;	non-persons	can	use	it	only	to refer	to	the	person	they	overlap	with.	Armed	with	PPR,	the	self-making	view	solves	both the	Problem	of	Overlappers	and	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons:	when	self-referring,	we 6 The division between heavyweight and deflationist views is not necessarily sharp. According to reference magnetism, a view inspired by Lewis 1983, meaning is determined by use and intrinsic eligibility.	One	might	think	that	various	questions	about	the	metaphysics	of	persons	turn	on	the	meaning of the predicate 'is a person', which is determined by	what strikes the best balance between use and eligibility. Sider (2001a), who is otherwise sympathetic to magnetism, considers and rejects its application	to	personal	identity.	(I	refer	to	magnetism	merely	as	a	view	inspired	by	Lewis,	since	it	remains controversial	whether	Lewis	himself	ever	endorsed	it;	see	Weatherson	2013	and	Schwarz	2014.) 7 See Burke 1994 and Sider 2001b, 2003. Note that the maximality principle does not provide a full solution,	since it	does	not imply that	my	nose-complement is	not	a	person. It implies	merely that if the human	organism	I	think	I	am	is	a	person,	then	my	nose-complement	is	not	(cf.	Olson	1995). 8	This	is	Jackson's	(1998)	general	view	about	linguistic	meaning. 9	See	Braddon-Mitchell	and	Miller	2004	and	Miller	2013	for	this	view. 6 automatically	refer	to	things	that	satisfy	most	of	our	'I'-thoughts,	and	since	these	things 'I'-referents,	they	are	automatically	persons. The	self-making	view	is	not	without	predecessors.	Other	philosophers	have	argued that	the	kinds	of	changes	a	person	can	survive	depend	on	that	person's	self-conception (Nozick (1981, p. 60) or her concerns and expectations (Johnston 1989, BraddonMitchell and West 2001). However, these approaches importantly differ from mine. First, as Eklund (2004) notes, these authors are at bottom interested in self-concern relativism,	the	view	that	the	proper	target	of	our	prudential	concern	is	to	some	extent up to us. By contrast,	my interest is chiefly	metaphysical (though the view has some interesting	ethical	consequences,	as	I	will	show	in	section	4).	Moreover, these	authors are	typically	interested	in	persistence	over	time,	an	issue	I	will	have	little	to	say	about here; my primary concern is identity and composition at a time. Finally, and most importantly,	while	the	view	has	its	predecessors,	the	motivation	I	will	offer	for	it	is,	so far as I know, entirely new. In the next section I	will explain the self-making view in more	detail	and	offer	some	reason	to	believe	it. 3.	The	self-making	view I think I am	a	humanoid	with a nose, rather than a nose-complement embedded in a humanoid.	But	of	course,	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	me	pause:	what	makes	it	the case, and how can I know, that I thereby believe something true about a humanoid rather	than	something	false	about	a	nose-complement?	A	deflationist	answer	will	posit a link between the intuitive correctness of such beliefs and the mechanism of selfreference.	The	specific link	I	propose is this:	most	of	our 'I'-thoughts	are true	because they automatically refer to a candidate that	makes them true. Take, for example, the belief	I	express	when	uttering	the	sentence	'I	have	a	nose'.	There	are	lots	of	things	here that	have	a	nose:	a	whole	human	organism,	a	leg-complement,	a	hand-complement,	etc. Other	things	equal,	these	are	better	candidates	for	being	referred	to	by	my	'I'-thoughts than	my nose-complement. But of course, other things are not equal: many of these candidates fare	worse than	my nose-complement	when it comes to beliefs about	my other	parts.	There	is,	however,	a	candidate	that	makes	more	of	my	beliefs	true	than	any of	my	overlappers,	a	candidate	that	has	all the	parts	I	ascribe	to	myself.	Since	there is such	a	candidate,	I	do	have	these	parts;	and	since	I	know	that	there	is	such	a	candidate,	I know	that	I	have	them.	This	is	why	I	am	(and	I	know	that	I	am)	a	humanoid,	rather	than a noseless overlapper. In a slogan form:	You are the best candidate satisfier of the 'I'thoughts entertained in your vicinity. This slogan conveys the gist of my view, but it requires	three	qualifications. First, how should we understand the expression 'the 'I'-thoughts entertained in one's vicinity'? Importantly, on my proposal, when I believe that I have a nose, my overlapper	also	believes	that	I	have	a	nose;	it	does	not	believe	that	it	has	a	nose.	There are many overlappers where I am, but when entertaining 'I'-thoughts they are all thinking	of	me;	I,	on	the	other	hand,	am	thinking	of	myself.	While	I	am	happy	to	say	that my	overlappers	share	my	thoughts,	it	would	be	somewhat	misleading	(though	true)	to say that they share my de se or 'I'-thoughts. This latter claim is naturally read as 7 meaning	that	I	and	my	overlappers	believe	the	same	things	of	ourselves.	But	that	is	not my	view.	My	view	is	that	my	overlappers	have	numerically	the	same	de	se	beliefs	that	I have,	but	from	their	perspective	these	beliefs	are	not	de	se	at	all;	they	are	beliefs	about me, not about them.	Hence the technical expression ''I'-thoughts entertained in one's vicinity'. Second, it is of course possible to lack knowledge about	what one's parts are for reasons	unrelated	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	even	if	there	is	a	candidate	that	would make the requisite beliefs true. Suppose I hallucinate, and on that account come to believe,	that	someone	chopped	off	my	right	arm.	Is	my	belief	that	I	have	no	right	arm	a true	belief	about	an	arm-complement	or	a	false	belief	about	something	that	does	have	a right arm? Intuitively it is the latter, and the self-making view should not predict otherwise.	The	original	slogan	should	be	amended	to	take	care	of	such	cases.	But	such an	amendment	is	also	independently	motivated.	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	concerns an essentially indexical piece	of information: even	once all facts about the candidates and their	parts are settled, these facts still do	not	guarantee that I am	not	a	handless overlapper;	moreover,	knowledge	of	all these facts	at	best	equips	me	with	knowledge that I am	one of the candidates but fails to rule out that I am a handless overlapper. However,	if	I	falsely	believe	that	my	right	hand	has	been	chopped	off	I	also	do	not	know various non-indexical truths about which candidates exist and what their parts are. Then the	modified	slogan,	which is	more in	keeping	with the	spirit	of the	self-making view,	can	be	stated	as follows:	You	are the	best candidate satisfier	of those 'I'-thoughts entertained	in	your	vicinity	that	are	not	based	on	ignorance	(lack	of	knowledge)	about	the relevant	non-indexical	truths. The third qualification is best brought out by a natural but mistaken complaint against	the	self-making	view.	The	objection	is	that	the	method	of	identifying	us	with	the best candidate referents of our 'I'-thoughts will not narrow down the number of candidates	to	one,	so	the	self-making	view	does	not	solve	the	Problem	of	Overlappers. Since	we	have	beliefs	about	our	legs,	arms	and	nose	but	not	about	the	electron	in	the	tip of a hair that is on the verge of falling out, there	will always be some indeterminacy about the reference of 'I'. In response, I should emphasize again that the Problem of Overlappers	is	a	puzzle	about	why	we	are	(and	how	we	can	usually	know	that	we	are) things	with	the	parts	we	intuitively	think	we	have.	The	threat	this	problem	poses	is	not referential indeterminacy but massive and determinate error. Since the self-making view explains why we do not commit this kind of error, it solves the Problem of Overlappers.	That	due to the	widespread	phenomenon	of referential indeterminacy it does not guarantee a single referent is simply beside the point.10 Nevertheless, the 10	What	does the	self-making	view	say	about	particles that	obviously	and	determinately	seem	to	be	my parts but of	which I have no beliefs either	way? For example,	what about a particular electron in the middle of	my body? Cases like this do not pose a problem for the self-making view. Take a particular electron	e	that	is	clearly	a	part	of	my	right	leg.	While	it	is	true	that	I	have	no	beliefs	about	e,	I	do	believe that	the	right	leg	is	a	part	of	me.	So	the	best	candidate	referent	of	my	'I'-thoughts	is	something	that	has	the right	leg.	But	parthood	is	transitive.	So	this	best	candidate	also	has	e	as	a	part.	The	self-making	view	does not	imply	that	to	have	some	x	as	a	part	it	is	necessary	to	believe	that	one	has	x	as	a	part. 8 objection	does	show	that	there	may	be	no	such	thing	as	the	best	candidate	satisfier	of our	'I'-thoughts.	We	can	take	this	point	and	modify	the	slogan	one	last	time	as	follows: You	are	one	of the	best satisfiers	of those 'I'-thoughts	entertained in	your	vicinity	which are not based on ignorance about the relevant non-indexical truths. This formulation allows	for	ties.	But	it	is	an	unlovely	mouthful,	so	in	the	interest	of	readability	I	will	often leave the	qualifications implicit	and	refer to the	self-making	view	as the	view	that	we are	the	best	candidate	referents	of	the	'I'-thoughts	entertained	in	our	vicinity.11 Hopefully,	by	now	we	have	a	sufficiently	clear	grasp	of	what	the	self-making	view	is. But	do	we	have	any	reason	to	accept it? I think	we	do.	Though	I	have	no	knock-down argument	to	offer,	I	would	like	to	mention	a	few	considerations	that	to	my	mind	make the view very attractive. These fall into two categories. First, we have 'bottom-up' considerations: the self-making view dovetails with plausible views about demonstrative reference and mental content. Second, there are 'top-down' considerations:	the	self-making	view	has	great	problem-solving	potential. Let us start with the 'bottom-up' motivations. It is customary to distinguish between	pure	indexicals	('I', 'today', 'tomorrow')	and	true	demonstratives	('this', 'that', 'she', 'he'). The difference is, roughly, that while the reference of a pure indexical is secured	'automatically'	by	its	meaning	and	the	context	(Perry	1997,	pp.	595–6), in	the case of true demonstratives some extra effort is required – perhaps a physical demonstration (Kaplan 1989a, Reimer 1991) or certain directing intentions (Kaplan 1989b, Bach 1992, Perry 1997, p. 595). An interesting intermediate group includes demonstratives	such	as 'here'	and 'now'.	Arguably, these	demonstratives	are like	pure indexicals in that their meaning and context put automatic constraints on their reference.	But	they	are	like	true	demonstratives	in	that	these	constraints	leave	standing more	than	one	candidate	referent.	Typical	uses	of	'here'	refer	to	the	speaker's	location, but there can be considerable variation in the extent of this location: it can be the speaker's	immediate	vicinity,	her	room,	her	apartment,	etc.	Mutatis	mutandis	for	'now': in	every	context it refers to the time	of the	utterance,	but the	span	of that time is	not constant.12 We could say that the reference of such indexicals is secured 'quasiautomatically'	and,	following	Recanati	2001,	call	them	impure	indexicals:	their	meaning and	context	puts	automatic	constraints	on their reference,	but these	constraints leave some	wiggle	room	that	we	do	not	find	in	pure	indexicals. Whether	the	reference	of	true	demonstratives	depends	on	the	speaker's	intention	is a	controversial	issue.	But	it	seems	evident	that	intention	plays	a	role	in	determining	the reference of impure indexicals such as 'here' and 'now'. This is not to say that in the absence of such an intention, 'here' and 'now'-utterances are vacuous; perhaps they have	an	element	of	indeterminacy	and	still	come	out	true	on	every	precisification,	as	in 11	Hawthorne	(2006)	briefly	entertains	a	view	somewhat	similar	to	my	self-making	view.	This	view	does not seem to	allow for ties, since	Hawthorne	presents it as	a	proposal	about	how to	precisify the	vague predicate 'is a person'. As should be clear by now, I think that the Problem of Overlappers should be sharply	distinguished	from	any	problem	having	to	do	with	vagueness. 12	Kaplan includes 'here' and 'now'	on	his	official list	of	pure indexicals,	but	as	he	points	out they	both suffer	from	a	certain	amount	of	vagueness	(1989a,	p.	491	f12). 9 'There are no	mammoths here'. I am	making a	much	weaker claim: in central cases, when	the	speaker	knows	the	relevant	non-indexical	truths,	her	intention	constrains	the indexical's	reference	so	as	to	make	her	utterance	true.	Suppose	that	sitting	in	my	chair,	I look to the right and see my cup on the table. I then utter: 'The cup is here'. The reference	of	'here'	is	quasi-automatic:	it	has	to	include	my	exact	location,	but	it	can	also include	more.	One	might	then	ask:	what	makes it the	case	that I truly	said	of	a	spatial region	including	my	table	that	my	cup	was	present	in	it,	rather	than	falsely	of	a	smaller region	not	including	the	table?	Arguably,	the	answer	is	simply	that	to	some	extent	it	is up to me which place I refer to when I say 'here', and I had in mind a region that included	the	table.	There	are limits to	this; for instance	I	could	not	mean	your	table if you	lived	thousands	of	miles	away	from	me.	But	within	certain	constraints,	I	can	simply decide	to	use	'here'	so	as	to	include	my	table.	Similar	remarks	apply	to	'here'and	'now'thoughts.	If	looking	to	the	right	I	see	that	my	cup	is	on	the	table,	my	thought	that	the	cup is here is very easily true-true simply because I know the relevant non-indexical truths,	and	the	table	is	within	the	range	of	locations	I	can	think	of	as	'here'.13 Now, 'I' is almost invariably treated as belonging to the same group of pure indexicals	as	'today'	and	'tomorrow'.	However,	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	should	make us realize that it is in fact closer to 'here' and 'now'. In every context, several overlapping locations are intrinsically eligible to be picked out by 'here'. Likewise, in every	context	several	person-candidates	are	intrinsically	eligible	to	be	picked	out	by	'I'. This	may	be	puzzling,	but	luckily	a	solution	naturally	recommends	itself.	Above	I	have suggested that our 'here'-thoughts and utterances are usually true because we have some freedom	about	which	place	we	pick	out	with them.	The truth	of	most	of	our 'I'thoughts	can	be	explained	in	a	similar	way.	I	know	that	there	is	at	least	one	entity	here that	has four limbs, and this	entity is intrinsically	eligible to	be the referent	of	my 'I'thought.	So	my	belief	that	I	have	four	limbs	is	easily	true-just	as	easily	as	my	belief	that the	cup	is	here.	To	be	sure,	as	a	matter	of fact 'I'	shows	more	stability in its	reference than 'here': with a few exceptions (which I will discuss in section 4), most of us consistently	use	'I'	to	refer	to	a	humanoid.	But	I	maintain	that	this	difference	is	only	one of	degree.	If	that	is	right,	we	get	the	following	argument	for	the	self-making	view.	That our intentions have a role in reference determination (or at least reference constraining) is highly plausible for impure indexicals such as 'here' and 'now'; the Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	us	reason	to	think	that	'I',	too,	is	an	impure	indexical;	and so it is natural to accept that our intentions play a similar role in constraining the reference	of	our	'I'-thoughts.	But	to	accept	this	is	to	accept	the	self-making	view. To	my	mind,	the	aforementioned	analogy	with	'here'	is	already	quite	suggestive.	But the	self-making	view	also	dovetails	nicely	with	a	plausible	big-picture	theory	of	mental content,	advocated	in	a	series	of	papers	by	David	Lewis.14	Lewis's	core	question	is	how 13	Recanati	(2001)	presents	essentially	this	view	about	'here'	and	'now'	as	more	or	less	the	standard	view in	the	literature.	Like	most	philosophers	of	language	writing	on	indexicals,	Recanati	focuses	on	utterances involving	'here'	and	'now'	and	is	less	concerned	with	'here'and	'now'-thoughts. 14	See	Lewis	1974,	1979,	1983,	1994.	I	follow	Weatherson	2013	and	Schwarz	2014	in	assigning	a	rather limited	role	to	naturalness	in	Lewis's	theory	of	content.	But	even	if	I	turned	out	to	be	wrong,	this	would 10 the	objective	facts	determine	mental	content,	and	his	starting	point	is	the	platitude	that mental states are caused by experiential input and cause behaviour. This raises a version	of	the	problem	of	radical	interpretation:	a	mental	state's	experiential	input	and behavioural	output	still	underdetermine	its	content.	Lewis	thinks	that	to	overcome	this problem	we	need	to	appeal to	certain	basic	principles	of folk	psychology, 'our	general theory of persons' (1974, p. 334). One such principle is that a subject's attitudes generally	rationalize	her	behaviour;	other	things	equal	a	subject's	beliefs	are	sensitive to	her	evidence	and	apt to cause	behaviour that fits	her	goals.	On	Lewis's	view, these general constraints are constitutive of mental content: we cannot believe or desire things	that	are	too	unfit	to	be	believed	or	desired. Lewis never discusses the Problem of Overlappers15, but his theory of content suggests	a	plausible	way to	attack it.	Consider	a set	of	overlapping	person-candidates whose behaviour and speech acts indicate that they believe of something in their vicinity	that	it	has	human	form.	Our	task	is	to	determine	the	content	of	these	beliefs.	The epistemological	upshot	of	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	was	that	the	candidates	did	not differ	with	respect to	their	evidence. In	that	case, it	would	be in	Lewis's	spirit to	start with the 'I'-predications, leave open their subject, and ask which referent the 'I'thoughts	are	fit	to	be	believed	about.	The	mere	fact	that	the	candidates	have	the	same evidence does not prevent them from knowing certain truisms, for example that no limb-complement	has four limbs.	This	helps	determine	what is	and	what is	not fit for them	to	believe.	If	they	say,	'I	have	two	hands	and	two	legs',	we	can	take	them	to	express a belief about a humanoid. If instead we took them to express a belief about a legcomplement, we would violate a principle of constitutive rationality: since the legcomplement	obviously	does	not	have	four	limbs,	we	would	thereby	assign	to	a	person content that clearly does not fit her evidence. I do not want to suggest that Lewis himself	would	accept this reasoning.	But the	self-making	view	strikes	me	as	a	natural application	of	the	general	Lewisian	idea	that	constitutive	rationality	plays	a	role	in	the determination	of	content. We	can	now	turn	to 'top-down'	considerations	in	support	of	the	self-making	view. As I already	argued, the	view	provides	a	nice solution to the	Problem	of	Overlappers. But in	doing	so, it	also	displays	a further	virtue: it is	structurally	similar	to	an	elegant solution to the Problem of Almost-Persons. Taking this solution on board, we get a unified treatment of two closely related puzzles in the metaphysics of persons. According	to	Noonan's	PPR, the first-person	pronoun	can	only	refer to	persons.	When an overlapper uses the	word 'I' it does not refer to itself but to	whichever person it overlaps.16	I	find	this	proposal	attractive.	Note,	however,	that	it	only	solves	the	Problem not	matter to the	present	discussion, since the	various	overlapping	person-candidates	plausibly	do	not differ in their	naturalness	enough for this to	be the tip	of the	scale	(see	Sider	2001a for	a	similar	point about	identity	over	time).	For	a	related	line	of	thought	along	Davidsonian	interpretationist	lines	and	with quite	different	results,	see	Madden	2011b. 15	He	does	discuss	the	Problem	of	the	Many	(Lewis	1993),	which,	recall,	is	a	very	different	problem. 16	See	Noonan	1998,	2001,	and	2010.	Note	that	Noonan	himself	employed	the	idea	to	solve	the	Problem	of the	Thinking	Animal,	while	I	am	applying	it	to	persons	and	their	overlappers. 11 of	Almost-Persons;	it	leaves	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	completely	untouched	(not	that Noonan	suggests	otherwise).	For	instance,	it	implies	that	when	I	say	or	think	'I'	I	refer	to a person, but it does	not ensure that this person is not a nose-complement. The selfmaking	view	solves	this	problem:	I	am	a	humanoid	and	not	a	nose-complement	because when	I	think	or	say	'I',	I	refer	to	the	best	candidate	referent	of	my	'I'-thoughts,	and	the best candidate is a humanoid and not a nose-complement. So there is nothing metaphysically special about the entity that has my boundaries (which are the boundaries	of	a	humanoid)	as	opposed	to	the	boundaries	of	my	nose-complement.	The only	sense	in	which	the	humanoid	is	special	is	that	it	happens	to	be	the	best	candidate referent	of	my	'I'-thoughts. The	self-making	view	also	gives	a	non-mysterious	explanation	of	how	we	can	know that	we	have	the	boundaries	we	have.	Not	because	despite	our	great	physical	similarity there	is	a	deep	metaphysical	difference	between	us	and	our	overlappers	that	somehow prevents	the	latter	from	even	being	candidate	'I'-referents.	Also	not	because	we	possess extraordinary	epistemic	powers	that	help	us	make	extremely fine-grained	distinctions among several overlapping objects, some of which differ from us only in negligible respects.	Nor	by	relying	on	some	very	strong	form	of	externalism	that in	effect	denies that the Probem of Overlappers poses any epistemological challenge.17 Rather, our overlappers	are	metaphysically	on	a	par	with	us,	our	capacities	are	fairly	ordinary,	and so	is	the	world	we	inhabit	with	respect	to	its	epistemic	friendliness.	Yet	these	ordinary capacities and circumstances are just good enough. All we need is to be able to distinguish	between the candidates and	our surroundings. If the	world contributes in the not overly demanding sense of containing enough candidates to make our 'I'thoughts	true,	we	do	not	have	to	be	metaphysically	distinguished,	extraordinarily	lucky or	particularly	sophisticated	to	know	that	we	are	what	we	typically	think	we	are. Clearly, Noonan's PPR plays an important role in	my account. One reason is the aforementioned	structural	similarity:	in	each	case,	the	strategy	is	to	say	that	I	cannot	be the	wrong	sort	of	thing	because	when	that	thing	says	or	thinks	'I',	it	refers	to	me	rather than	itself.	But	there	is	also	a	second,	equally	important	reason.	In	conjunction	with	the earlier mentioned Remainder Principle (section 2), my view has the surprising consequence that some	of us	are hand-, armand leg-complements. Those	who think that	persons	cannot	be	proper	parts	of	humanoids	may	then	object	that	the	self-making view implies that some 'I'-referents are not persons, thereby violating the Person Constraint.	We	can stave	off this	worry	by combining the self-making	view	with	PPR: since 'I'	always	refers	to	a	person, 'I'-referents	that	are	proper	parts	of	humanoids	are indeed persons. So the self-making view is perfectly compatible with the Person Constraint;	what	has	to	be	rejected	is	the	assumption	that	persons	always	have	human form.	I	turn	to	these	issues	in	the	next	section. 17 Madden (forthcoming) presents and dismisses such a response. The idea is that if I were a handcomplement	I	would	not	possess	the	same	evidence	that	I	in	fact	possess	for	having	a	hand,	since	it	would not	even	be	true	that	I	have	a	hand.	I	side	with	Madden	in	finding	this	answer	unsatisfactory. 12 4.	Self-making	and	Body	Integrity	Identity	Disorder The	self-making	view	itself	might	sound	strange	at	first	glance,	but	as	we	have	seen,	in most cases it delivers intuitive results.	Things are a	bit different for	people	who	hold unusual beliefs about their parts. Take, for example, Body Integrity Identity	Disorder (BIID), a rare psychological condition often categorized as a mental illness. Patients suffering from this condition	believe that at least one of their healthy limbs	does not belong to them and that they could live a happier life	without that limb.18 (This is a controversial description; some would say that most BIID patients accept that as a matter	of	fact	they	have	the	unwanted	limb	and	only	believe	that	they	should	not	have it.19	Never	mind:	what	is	essential	to	the	point	of	this	section	is	the	belief	that	one	does not have a body part that one appears to have. If you think BIID is not a genuine example	of	that,	replace	every	future	occurrence	of	'BIID'	with	'the	belief	that	one	does not	have	a	certain	body	part'.20) In	the	bioethics	literature,	there	is	a	heated	debate	about	the	moral	permissibility	of elective	amputation.21	The	details	of	this	debate	should	not	concern	us	here;	I	just	want to	draw	attention	to	the	widely	shared	assumption	that	when	BIID	patients	believe	that their	unwanted limbs	do	not	belong to them, they	are irrational and strictly speaking wrong. The two claims are not independent from each other: the assumption is that BIID patients are obviously wrong about their body parts and, since their mistake cannot	plausibly	be	explained	as	epistemically	blameless,	they	are	irrational	too.	Why? The	bioethics	literature	does	not	go	into	that,	but	presumably	the	answer	is	roughly	that the	patients	do	not	respond	appropriately	to	their	evidence:	they	have	perceptual	and proprioceptive evidence that they have certain limbs (they neither hallucinate nor experience lack	of	control),	yet they	deny	that they	have the limb in	question.	Now	of course	the	irrationality	hypothesis	does	not	by	itself	settle	the	dispute,	for	perhaps	we have	good	moral	reasons	to	respect	some	irrational	and	false	beliefs.	But	the	hypothesis nicely explains	why the issue is so controversial: it would be	much	more difficult to show that there is even a	prima facie	moral problem	with elective amputation if the patients'	beliefs	were	neither	false	nor	irrational. However,	if	the	limb-complements	in	question	exist,	the	self-making	view	appears	to block	the	implicit	reasoning	behind	the	irrationality	hypothesis.	When	some	'I'-thoughts are	entertained in the	vicinity	of	a set	of	overlapping	person-candidates, they	refer to their	best	candidate	referent.	If	that	is	right,	a	case	can	be	made	that	BIID	patients	are neither	irrational	nor	mistaken	about	their	parts.	Take	a	host	of	overlapping	candidates 18	Here	and	in	what	follows,	I	assume	that	some	x	belongs	to	S	iff	S	has	x	as	a	part. 19	Bayne	and	Levy	(2005)	cite	a	survey,	according	to	which	only	13%	of	BIIDs	reported	that	the	unwanted limb	was	not	their	own. 20 I am also assuming that BIID patients' de se beliefs are consistent. For instance if a BIID patient is attached	to	a	left	leg	with	a	birthmark	on	it,	he	does	not	believe	both	that	he	does	not	have	the	left	leg	and that	he	has	the	birthmark.	When	such	inconsistencies	arise,	the	best	candidate	referent	has	to	be	settled on a case-by-case basis: which belief is more central in the patient's belief system? For the sake of simplicity,	here	I	stick	to	clear	cases	in	which	the	patient's	beliefs	about	his	parts	are	fully	consistent. 21	See	Bayne	&	Levy	2005,	Levy	2009,	and	J.	Kovacs	2009	in	defence	of	and	Müller	2009	against	elective amputation. 13 that	display	the	symptoms	of	BIID.	These	candidates	share	the	'I'-thought	expressible	by the	English	sentence	'I	have	exactly	three	limbs'.	Here	is	the	crux:	there	is	a	candidate	to make	this	thought	true.	Of	course	this	candidate	is	attached to	a limb,	but	he	does	not have	it	as	a	part.	So	we	have	reason	to	treat	the	limb-complement	as	the	referent	of	the 'I'-thoughts entertained in the candidates' vicinity, given that it is a better satisfier of these	thoughts	than	the	humanoid	containing	it.	You	might	think	that	people	just	cannot be undetached limb-complements, so all that follows is the absurd conclusion that in some	cases the	candidate	picked	out	by	the 'I'-thoughts is	not	a	person.	This is	where Noonan's	PPR	comes	to	action:	since	'I'	can	only	refer	to	persons,	the	undetached	limbcomplement	is	a	person,	but	the	humanoid	containing	it	is	not.	So	some	persons,	namely BIID	patients,	are	undetached	limb-complements. At	this	point,	one	may	wonder	if	this	is	a	proper	application	of	the	self-making	view: is it not just obvious that BIID patients are irrational because they do not respond appropriately	to	their	evidence?	No,	it	is	not.	Unlike	my	imagined	hallucinator	in	section 2,	BIID	patients	are	not	ignorant	about	the	relevant	non-indexical	truths.	They	are	fully aware that there is a humanoid in their vicinity, and they perceive and feel the unwanted limb-they just do not think they have it as a part. But this is not at all incompatible with their evidence. The epistemological moral of the Problem of Overlappers	is	that	our	usual	sources	of	evidence	do	not	distinguish	between	us	and	our overlappers:	they	equip	us	only	with	knowledge	that	something	with	our	thinking	parts has	such	and	such	parts,	not	that	we	have	such	and	such	parts.	Of	course	we	can	(and typically	do)	treat	the	largest	candidate	as	the	referent	of	our	'I'-thoughts,	but	doing	so is	by	no	means forced	by	our	evidence.	So	BIID	patients	do	not	respond	badly	to	their evidence	by	not following	suit.	But then,	we	are left	with	no	good	reason for thinking that	they	are	irrational. BIID	patients	are	not	humanoids	who	are	wrong	about	their	parts.	They	are	exactly what	they	think	they	are:	limb-complements	enclosed	in	humanoids.	Moreover,	they	are not irrational in thinking so. I have to admit that it is not just that I do not find this implication	absurd	or	outrageous.	I	find	it	liberating:	it	makes	metaphysical	sense	of	the often-heard slogan, 'You are what you think you are'. Elective amputation has sometimes	been	compared	to	sex	reassignment	surgery	in	that	those	opting	for	it	often feel	that	they	were 'born	in	the	wrong	body'	(J.	Kovacs	2009,	p.	44). I	want	to	suggest that	in	the	case	of	BIID	patients,	even	this	is	an	understatement:	they	already	have	the right	body	and	are	just	surrounded	by	the	wrong	accessories. That	at	the	end	of	the	day	BIID	patients'	beliefs	about	their	parts	are	neither	false nor irrational is, I realize, a surprising consequence of the self-making view and the Remainder	Principle	that	some	would	even	take	to	be	a	reductio. I	have	little	to	say	in response	other	than	that	I	do	not	find	this	consequence	counterintuitive	at	all,	and	until I	see	a	positive	argument	to	the	contrary,	I	happily	embrace	it.	In	the	next	section	I	will consider	some	objections	that	I	take	to	be	more	serious.	As	we	will	see	none	of	them	is compelling,	but	they	provide	ample	opportunity	to	further	refine	and	clarify	the	view. 14 5.	Objections	and	answers 5.1.	Self-reference	and	'I'-thoughts PPR plays double duty in	my account. For one, it ensures that the view respects the Person Constraint. For another, it helps give a unified solution to the Problem of Overlappers and the Problem of Almost-Persons. In this sub-section I address two objections	to	the	claim	that	when	using	the	personal	pronoun 'I'	only	persons	refer	to themselves,	while their	overlappers	refer to the	persons they	overlap.	The first	one is that	this	claim	is	simply	false.	The	second	is	that	even	if	true,	it	is	of	no	help	in	solving the	Problem	of	Overlappers. Let	me	start	with	the	first	worry.	Madden	maintains	that [T]here is no evident reason to think that our use of the first-person pronoun is governed by a convention	of	referring	to	any	particular	kind	of	object.	It	is	improbable	that	the	standing	meaning	of a word such as 'I' embodies any restriction on the kind of thing to	which it	may refer. (Madden forthcoming,	§2.2) Now, it is	clear from	the	context that	by 'kind'	Madden	means	something	with	certain persistence	conditions	(see	also	2011a,	p.	345),	and	I	agree	with	him	that	the	semantics of 'I'	has	no	built-in	restriction	on the	persistence	conditions	of its referent.	However, PPR imposes	no such restriction; all it requires is that	whatever 'I' refers to	also falls under the	predicate 'is a	person',	whether the	property	of	being	a	person	determines persistence	conditions	or	not.	This	weaker	thesis	retains	Noonan's	core	insight	that	it	is something like a conceptual truth that the first-person pronoun can only refer to persons.	And	I	maintain	that	pace	Madden	this	view	is	plausible,	once	stripped	off the essentialist	connotations. Elsewhere,	Madden	(2011a)	argues	against	PPR	in	a	slightly	different	way.	The	gist of	his	objection	is	this.	The	best	non-circular	explanation	of	the	intention	to	self-refer	is that the intention's content is a repeatable act of the form x refers to x. But since an overlapper (or in Madden's discussion, an animal) is able to entertain the thought x refers	to	x,	it	is	also	able	to	self-refer.	In	response,	we	can	grant	the	general	rule	that	selfreference	involves	grasping	the	thought	x	refers	to	x	but	maintain	that	a	successful	selfreferential	use	of 'I'	also	requires	that	one	be	a	person.	Madden	asks	what,	given	their grasp of what it is for an x to refer to x, could possibly prevent non-persons from referring to themselves. The answer is: nothing. The claim has never been that the overlappers	are	unable	to	refer	to	themselves.	The	claim	is	merely	that	they	cannot	have self-referential	'I'-thoughts.22 Let	me	now	turn	to	the	second	concern:	even	if	PPR	is	correct,	there	is	an	aspect	of the	Problem	of	Overlappers that neither it nor	my self-making view can solve (Olson 1997b, 2002, Madden forthcoming). The problem is supposed to be that even if my overlappers	cannot	use	the	word 'I'	to	refer	to	themselves, it	does	not	follow	that	they cannot think of themselves in the first-person	mode.	Perhaps	when I open	my	mouth 22	Noonan	(2001,	p.	328)	makes	a	similar	point. 15 and say, 'I have two	hands', the semantics of 'I' ensures that	my	handless overlapper also says something true. But the overlapper is not thereby prevented from falsely believing	that	it	has	a	hand,	even	if	it	cannot	give	linguistic	expression	to	this	belief.	And so	I	still	do	not	know	that	I	am	not	a	handless	overlapper. While	Noonan	usually	formulates	PPR	as	a	view	about	the	linguistic	expression	'I',	I have	all	along	been talking	both	about first-person language	and first-person thought. There	is	one	place	where	Noonan	indicates	that	his	account	is	also	intended	to	apply	to 'I'-thoughts:	'there	is	no	ignorance	of	the	kind	Olson	describes',	he	writes,	'because	there is	no	expressible	thought	whose	truth-value	is	unknowable	in	the	way	he	thinks'	(2001, p. 328). I want to give essentially the same answer. When I think the thought expressible	by	the	sentence	'I	have	a	nose',	there	is	only	one	thought	entertained	here. Of course, my overlappers can and do have 'I'-thoughts, but these are numerically identical to	my 'I'-thoughts. And since my 'I'-thoughts refer to their best candidate referent,	there	is	no	room	left	for	my	overlappers'	'I'-thoughts	to	refer	to	anything	else- otherwise	they	would	not	be	numerically	identical	to	my	'I'-thoughts	(they	would	have different	content-see	sub-section	5.3). This	last	claim	might	be	exactly	what	Olson	and	Madden	tacitly	reject:	perhaps	they think	that	my	overlappers'	thoughts	are	qualitatively	indistinguishable	but	numerically distinct	from	mine.	Motivated	by	this	intuition,	they	could	try	to	distinguish	the	Problem of Overlappers from the Problem of Overlapping Thoughts: which of the many qualitatively	indistinguishable	sets	of	thoughts	is	mine,	and	how	can	I	know	which	one is mine? I agree that neither PPR nor my self-making view solves this problem. However,	I	also	think	that	there	is	no	such	problem	to	begin	with.	The	reasoning	that	led to the	Problem	of	Overlappers simply	does	not	generate	anything like the	Problem	of Overlapping	Thoughts.23 One might try to argue that the Problem of Overlapping Thoughts is easily generated once we accept a Fregean conception of 'I'-thoughts. On the Fregean conception, 'I'-thoughts are constituted	by	private and	unshareable senses, so	no two subjects	can	share	numerically	the	same	'I'-thought.	Following	Morgan	(2009),	call	this the Unshareability Claim (UC). The usual motivation for UC lies in a functionalist account of first-person thought. Functionalist views characterize the essence of 'I'thoughts in	terms	of	the	perceptual/proprioceptive input	that	generates	them	and	the behavioural	output they	produce.24	Morgan, for	example,	argues	that	any functionalist account	has to	accept	at least	one	of the following	claims: (i)	only	my 'I'-thoughts	are sensitive	in	a	direct	way	to	gaining	perceptual	information	from	this	particular	point	of view; (ii) only	my 'I'-thoughts are sensitive to proprioceptive information gained via this particular body; and (iii) only	my 'I'-thoughts directly produce behaviour in this body.	As	a	result,	any	functionalist	account	of	first-person	thought	entails	UC	(2009,	pp. 73–4). 23	For	a	similar	distinction,	see	McMahan	2002,	p.	105	and	Zimmerman	2003a,	p.	508.	McMahan	takes	it to	be	obvious	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	the	Problem	of	Overlapping	Thoughts. 24	See	Evans	1981	for	a	classic	defence	of	the	Fregean-functionalist	view. 16 Of	course, functionalism	about 'I'-thoughts	is	a	controversial	thesis.	But	we	do	not need	to	take	a	stance	on	it	to	see	that	we	cannot	rely	on	any	of	(i)-(iii)	to	support	UC, since in light of the Problem of Overlappers we have reason to reject each of these principles. Principles (i) and (ii) are obviously based on the assumption that distinct subjects never gain the same perceptual and proprioceptive input through the same body.	But	I	and	my	overlappers	do	have	the	same	input:	we	share	a	point	of	view	from which everything looks and feels the same. Similar remarks apply to	principle (iii). It may be true that two disjoint subjects' behaviour is never produced by the same thoughts. But my thoughts do produce behaviour in my overlappers, and my overlappers' thoughts also produce behaviour in	me. It seems, then, that people and their overlappers pose a counterexample to each of (i)-(iii). The somewhat ironical upshot	is	that	UC,	the	extra	premiss	needed	to	get	from	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	to the Problem of Overlapping Thoughts, is undermined by the Problem of Overlappers itself. These	brief	remarks	are	not	intended	to	refute	the	spirit	of	functionalism	about	'I'thoughts.	My	point	is	merely	that	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	us	ample	reason	to reject	UC	as	formulated	above,	and	weaker	formulations	will	not	generate	the	Problem of Overlapping Thoughts. So we have been given no reason for thinking that our overlappers	may	have	false	but	inexpressible	beliefs	about	themselves. The	objections	discussed	so	far	were	directed	to	an	aspect	of	my	view	that	it	shares with	Noonan's. In the	remainder	of this	section, I	will	address	potential	complications that	are	specific	to	the	self-making	view. 5.2.	The	limits	of	self-making I	am	the	best	candidate	referent	of	the	'I'-thoughts	entertained	in	my	vicinity.	But	when is something a candidate referent of my 'I'-thoughts? Some cases seem obvious. My undetached	headless	torso,	for	instance,	does	not	have	my	thinking	parts	and	so	cannot think my 'I'-thoughts. Neither can subjects disjoint from me: though they can have thoughts,	they	lack	my	thinking	parts,	which	they	would	need	in	order	to	have	these	'I'thoughts.	Generally,	we	can	accept	the	following	constraint	on	what	can	be	a	candidate referent	of	a	set	of	'I'-thoughts: (Thinking Parts Constraint) If S is a candidate referent of the 'I'-thoughts entertained	in	S's	vicinity,	then	S*	is	a	candidate	referent	of	those	'I'-thoughts only if it	shares	those	of	S's	parts that	are	minimally	sufficient for	having 'I'thoughts. The	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	does	not	provide	a	non-circular	definition	of	candidacy. Indeed,	I	doubt	such	a	definition	is	possible.25	The	idea	is	that	we	all	have	a	clear	grasp of paradigm cases, which we can then use to circumscribe the less obvious ones. A 25	That	would	presumably	require	a	descriptivist	view	of	'I',	which	is	widely	thought	to	be	untenable	due to	arguments	by	Perry	(1979)	and	others. 17 whole human organism is undoubtedly a candidate referent of the 'I'-thoughts entertained	in	its	vicinity	even	if	(as	in	the	case	of	BIID	patients)	it	ultimately	fails	to	be a	referent	of those thoughts.	The	constraint	also	shows	why	we	are	not	committed to certain	implausible	cases	of	self-making:	lacking	thinking	parts,	head-complements	and corpses	are	not	even	candidate	'I'-referents.	The	self-making	view	clearly	has	its	limits: we	should	identify	BIID	patients	with	limb-complements,	but	as	these	examples	show, not	just	anything	goes.26 Another	interesting	question	that	is	not	settled	by	the	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	is whether	persons	can	have	humanoids	as	proper	parts	(rather	than	being	embedded	in them).	Can	a	person,	for	instance,	use	'I'	to	refer	to	the	mereological	sum	of	a	humanoid and	an	artificial	organ	or	prosthetic	limb?	Of	course,	for	this	question	to	even	arise	the mereological	sum	in	question	has	to	exist.	And	for	that,	we	have	to	make	assumptions stronger than the ones needed to generate the	Problem	of	Overlappers, and stronger even than those needed to derive the surprising consequences for BIID patients.	We have to assume not just the existence of undetached thinking parts but also a very liberal	theory	of	composition,	presumably	universalism	(the	view	that	any	arbitrary	xs in	any	arrangement	have	a	mereological sum).	But	on the	assumption that such	parthumanoid sums do exist, I remain open to the possibility that some of them are 'I'referents	and	therefore	persons.27	In	that	case,	we	can	take	some	people	to	literally	have their	artificial	organs	or	prosthetic	limbs	as	parts	if	they	think	they	have	them.28	I	will not	argue	for	this	view	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	the	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	does	not rule	it	out,	and	I	consider	this	a	good	thing. Can we say anything more general? Is, for example, the whole world or the mereological sum	of two conscious	beings a candidate for	being	me? If not,	why	not? Instead	of	offering	a	fully	general	answer,	I	wish	to	point	out	that	several	independently plausible	intrinsic	constraints	on	persons	deny	candidacy	from	such	things,	and	nothing in the	self-making	view forces	us to	give	up these	constraints.	For	example,	we	might want to require that any person satisfy certain	minimal requirements of physical or psychological	unity	so	that	the	mereological	sum	of	two	physically	disconnected	things or	two	distinct	loci	of	consciousness	is	never	even	a	person-candidate.	More	generally, 26	Motivated	by	familiar	externalist	"slow	switching"	scenarios,	Madden	has	recently	defended	a	kind	of "best-candidate"	theory	of	self-reference	according	to	which	it	is	sometimes	possible	for	a	dead	organism to	be the true referent 'I' if it is the	best	knowledge-maximizing	assignment to 'I' (2011b,	pp.	309–15). Despite	some	similarities,	my	view	is	importantly	different	from	Madden's.	First,	Madden	presupposes	an animalist	theory	of	personal	identity	and,	as	we	have	seen,	rejects	the	Person	Constraint.	Second,	the	selfmaking view is chiefly concerned	with self-reference	at a time and our knowledge thereof in ordinary cases,	while	Madden's	main interest lies in identity	over time,	especially in	certain	extraordinary	cases. My	preferred	approach	to	identity	over	time	is	also	quite	different	from	Madden's,	but	one	I	lack	space	to get	into	here. 27	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	personhood	of	such	things	is	perfectly	compatible	with	Williams's	partintrinsicality thesis, according to which any nomically possible duplicate of a person is a proper or improper	part	of	a	person	(2013,	p.	442). 28 It is difficult not to notice that this line of thought is a natural extension of the extended mind hypothesis,	famously	proposed	by	Clark	and	Chalmers	(1998). 18 the	self-making	view	is	compatible	with	many	different	takes	on	what	sorts	of	things	we are: essentially	psychological, phenomenal	or	biological	beings, or	what	have	you.	My own view is that	we cannot say anything general about	what kinds of things	we are other	than	that	we	are	material	objects.	But	this is	not	mandatory.	All the	self-making view	officially	requires is that	whatever intrinsic	conditions	something	has to	meet to be	a	referent	of	a	token	of 'I',	several	objects	satisfy	that	condition.29	This	is	where	my view can be the tip of the scale: of the several candidates in our vicinity that are intrinsically	eligible	to	be	the	referents	of	our	'I'-thoughts,	we	are	the	best	satisfiers	of these	thoughts. 5.3.	Concerns	about	conventions The	self-making	view	is	a	view	not	just	about	first-person	language	but	also	about	firstperson thought.	One	might	nevertheless	worry that it is	not really a revisionary	view about	self-reference.	Perhaps	people	are free	to	use	the	word 'I' to	refer	to	their limbcomplements, but in that case they just use the word	with a non-standard	meaning, since the linguistic conventions rule against people being limb-complements. The objector could grant even that BIID patients can think of their limb-complements in some broadly first-personal way, while maintaining that they do not have true 'I'thoughts about their limb-complements in the same sense most of us have true 'I'thoughts	about	ourselves. To	address	this	objection,	we	should	begin	by	asking	what	it	would	mean	for	BIID patients	and	the	rest	of	us	to	mean	different	things	by	'I'.	It	is	customary	in	the	literature on	indexicals	to	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	meaning:	if	you	say	'I	am	hungry'	and I say 'I am	hungry', there is intuitively a sense in	which	we say the same thing	and	a sense	in	which	we	say	different	things.	Following	Kaplan	(1989a),	I	will	refer	to	these	as character and	content, respectively, though there	are	many	other	ways to capture the distinction.30	Character is	the	kind	of	meaning	that is	constant	across	different	uses	of the	same	indexical,	while	content	is	the	one	that	varies	with	the	speaker.	So	when	you and	I	use	the	word	'I'	we	use	it	with	the	same	character	but	with	different	contents.	This narrows	down	our	question	to	whether	BIID	patients	use	the	word 'I'	with	a	different character than the rest of us (that they	use it	with a	different content is obvious and simply	respected	by	the	self-making	view). On	a	standard	view,	the	character	of	'I'	is	captured	by	the	rule	that	every	token	of	'I' refers	to	the	speaker	who	produces	that	token.	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	forces	us	to realize	that	there	is	an	obvious	problem	with	this	simple	rule:	there	are	many	speakers 29 Note that certain popular restrictions, for example that persons like us are human animals, do not specify	intrinsic	conditions.	Being	a	human	animal	is	a	maximal	property,	partly	a	matter	of	not	being	part of another	human	animal.	However, the self-making	view is still compatible	with a close cousin	of this view:	human	persons	are	intrinsically	qualified	to	be	human	animals. 30	The	distinction	is	not	always	captured	in	terms	of	different	kinds	of	meaning.	Perry	(1977,	1979),	for instance, argues that speakers uttering different tokens of the same 'I'-sentence express different propositions	but	are	in	the	same	type	of	belief	state.	Evans	(1981)	would	say	that	the	two	speakers	utter the	sentence	with	the	same	(character-like)	linguistic	meaning	but	have	different	thoughts. 19 for	every	token	of 'I',	so	there is	no	such	thing	as	the	speaker.	We	can	at	best	say	that every	token	of	'I'	refers	to	a	speaker	that	produces	it.	The	self-making	view	adds	that	for something	to	be	a	referent	of	'I',	it	is	not	enough	that	it	is	a	speaker;	it	has	to	be	the	best candidate	for	making	true	the	beliefs	expressed	by	the	speaker's	'I'-utterances.	Does	this imply	that	the	character	of	'I'	varies	across	speakers	depending	on	whether	the	speaker has	BIID?	I	do	not	see	why	it	would.	Of	course,	most	of	us	use	'I'	to	refer	to	a	humanoid, while	BIID	patients	use it to	refer to	a	proper	part	of	a	humanoid.	However, this	does not	mean	that	we	use 'I'	with	different	characters; indeed, it is implausible	that 'I'	has any built-in semantic restriction to humanoids. Recall the analogy with 'here' from section 2. The character of 'here' is usually specified by the rule that it picks out the speaker's location in every context, but as we know, there are	many things that can count	as the	speaker's location.	This	does	not imply that two	speakers	who	choose to refer to differently sized regions with 'here' are using the word with different characters.	Mutatis	mutandis	for	the	self-making	view:	just	because	I	use	the	word	'I'	for a	humanoid	and	a	BIID	patient	uses	it	for	a	proper	part	of	a	humanoid,	it	does	not	follow that	we	use	the	word	with	different	characters. 6.	Conclusion In	this	paper	I	canvassed,	admittedly	in	large	brush	strokes,	the	outlines	of	a	promising alternative to standard versions of conventionalism: persons are, within certain constraints, self-made.	There	are reasons to find this	view	attractive, and	while it	has some surprising consequences, I find these quite liberating, rather than repugnant. I also	considered	several	objections	to	the	view,	none	of	which	seems	compelling.	There are	many	open	issues	for	future	investigation	which	I	had	no	space	to	get	into	here	but hope to discuss elsewhere. The most obvious one is the question of diachronic selfmaking: do people have a say in how long and under what conditions they persist? While the self-making view does not force on us an affirmative answer, it would be natural	for	its	adherents	to	give	one.	In	the	present	work	I	intentionally	focused	on	the relation	between	persons	and	their	parts	at	a time.	The	emerging	picture	offers	novel and interesting	ways	of thinking	about	the	metaphysics	of	persons	and	can	be further developed	in	various	directions.	My	present	goal	was	just	to	put	the	self-making	view	on the	table	and	argue	that	it	deserves	to	be	taken	seriously.31 31 For invaluable discussion and comments on several earlier versions of this paper, I am especially indebted to Matti Eklund and Ted Sider. For helpful comments and criticisms I am also grateful to Mohammad	Azadpur,	Gábor	Bács,	Karen	Bennett,	Oisín	Deery,	Björn	Eriksson,	Peter	Fazekas,	Alex	Geddes, Philippe Lemoine, Peter Millican, Attila Mraz, Harold Noonan, Orsi Reich, Eric Rowe, Nico Silins, Rina Tzinman, Andrea Viggiano, the anonymous referees and editor of Mind, and audiences at the 2013 Meeting of the Pacific APA, the Central European University, Cornell University, Stockholm	University, and the	University	of	Oxford.	Writing this	paper felt almost like	a family	endeavour:	my interest in the ethics	of	amputation	was	raised	by	my	father	Jozsef	Kovacs,	and	the	idea	to	connect it to	puzzles in	the metaphysics	of	persons	was	inspired	by	a	conversation	with	my	brother	Adam	Kovacs.	Adam	is	a	dental technician,	and	he	frequently	encounters	people	who	want	to	get	rid	of	some	of	their	(?)	parts. 20 References Almog, Joseph, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds) 1989: Themes from Kaplan. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll 2010: 'Functionalism and Thinking Animals', Philosophical Studies,	147,	pp.	347–54. Bach,	Kent	1992:	'Intentions	and	Demonstrations'.	Analysis,	52,	pp.	140–6. Baker,	Lynne	R.	2000:	Persons	and	Bodies.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Batthyany,	Alexander	and	Avshalom	Elitzur	(eds)	2006:	Mind	and	Its	Place	in	the	World: Non-Reductionist	Approaches	to	the	Ontology	of	Consciousness.	Frankfurt:	Ontos. Bayne,	Tim	and	Neil	Levy	2005:	'Amputees	by	Choice:	Body	Integrity	Identity	Disorder and	the	Ethics	of	Amputation'.	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy,	22,	pp.	75–86. Blatti, Stephen and Paul Snowdon (eds) forthcoming: Essays on Animalism. Oxford University	Press. Braddon-Mitchell, David and Kristie	Miller 2004: 'How to be a Conventional Person'. Monist,	87,	pp.	457–74. Braddon-Mitchell, David and Caroline West 2001: 'Temporal Phase Pluralism'. Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	62,	pp.	59–83. Burke,	Michael	B.	1994:	'Dion	and	Theon:	An	Essentalist	Solution	to	an	Ancient	Puzzle'. Journal	of	Philosophy,	91,	pp.	129–39. --2003:	'Is	My	Head	a	Person?'.	In	Petrus	2003,	pp.	107–25. Campbell, Keith, John	Bacon and	Lloyd	Reinhardt (eds) 1993:	Ontology, Causality and Mind:	Essays	on	the	Philosophy	of	D.	M.	Armstrong.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University Press. Clark,	Andy	and	David	Chalmers	1998:	'The	extended	mind'.	Analysis,	58,	pp.	7–19. Eklund, Matti 2004: 'Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy'.	Monist, 87, pp. 489–511. Evans,	Gareth	1981: 'Understanding	Demonstratives'. In	Parret and	Bouveresse	1981, pp.	280–304. Gill,	Christopher	(ed)	1990:	The	Person	and	the	Human	Mind.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Guttenplan, Samuel (ed) 1994: A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright (eds) 1997: A Companion to Philosophy of Language. Oxford:	Blackwell. Hawley,	Katherine	1998:	'Merricks	on	Whether	Being	Conscious	is	Intrinsic'.	Mind,	107, pp.	841–3. Hawthorne, John 2006: 'Epistemicism and Semantic Plasticity'. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,	2,	pp.	289–322. Hershenov,	David	B.	2005:	'Persons	as	Proper	Parts	of	Organisms'.	Theoria,	71,	pp.	29– 37. Hirsch,	Eli	1982:	The	Concept	of	Identity.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Hudson, Hud 2001: A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Ithaca: Cornell University	Press. 21 --2007:	'I	Am	Not	an	Animal!,'	In	van	Inwagen	and	Zimmerman	2007,	pp.	216–34. Jackson,	Frank	1998: 'Reference	and	Description	Revisited'.	Philosophical	Perspectives, 12,	pp.	201–18. Johnston,	Mark	1989:	'Relativism	and	the	Self'.	In	Krausz	1989,	pp.	441–72. --2007: '"Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal'. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics,	3,	pp.	35–74. Kaplan,	David	1989a: 'Demonstratives'. In	Almog,	Perry	and	Wettstein	1989.	pp.	481– 563. --1989b:	'Afterthoughts'.	Almog,	Perry	and	Wettstein	1989,	pp.	565–614. Kovacs, David Mark 2010: 'Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem?'.	Ratio,	23,	pp.	275–90. Kovacs,	Jozsef	2009:	'Whose	Identity	is	It	Anyway?'.	American	Journal	of	Bioethics,	9,	pp. 44–5. Krausz,	Michael (ed) 1989:	Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Notre Dame, IN:	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press. Levy,	Neil	2009:	'Autonomy	is	(Largely)	Irrelevant'.	American	Journal	of	Bioethics,	9,	pp. 50–1. Lewis,	David	1974:	'Radical	Interpretation'.	Synthese,	23,	pp.	331–44. --	1976:	'Survival	and	Identity'.	In	Rorty	1976,	pp.	17–40. --	1979:	'Attitudes	De	Dicto	and	De	Se'.	Philosophical	Review,	88,	pp.	513–43. --1983: 'New	work	for	a	theory	of	universals'	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy,	61, pp.	343–77. --1993:	'Many,	but	almost	One'.	In	Campbell,	Bacon	and	Reinhardt	1993,	pp.	23–38. --1994:	'Reduction	of	Mind'.	In	Guttenplan	1994,	pp.	412–31. Madden, Rory 2011a: 'Intention and the Self'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111,	pp.	325–51. --2011b: 'Externalism and Brain Transplants'.	Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6, pp. 287–316. --forthcoming:	'Thinking	Parts'.	In	Blatti	and	Snowdon	forthcoming. McMahan,	Jeff	2002:	The	Ethics	of	Killing:	Problems	at	the	Margins	of	Life.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. Merricks, Trenton 1998: 'Against the	Doctrine of	Microphysical Supervenience'.	Mind, 107,	pp.	59–71. --2001: 'Realism about Personal Identity over Time'.	Philosophical Perspectives, 15, pp.	173–86. Miller,	Kristie	2013:	'"Personal	Identity"	minus	the	persons'.	Philosophical	Studies,	166, pp.	S91–S109. Müller, Sabine 2009: 'Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID)–Is the Amputation of Healthy	Limbs	Ethically	Justified?'.	American	Journal	of	Bioethics,	9:	36–43. Noonan, Harold W. 1998: 'Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy', Philosophical	Quarterly,	48:	302–18. --2001: 'The	Epistemological	Problem	of	Relativism	–	Reply to	Olson'.	Philosophical Studies,	104,	pp.	323–36. 22 --2010: 'The thinking animal problem	and	personal pronoun revisionism'.	Analysis, 70,	pp.	93–8. Nozick, Robert 1981: Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson,	Eric	1995:	'Why	I	Have	No	Hands'.	Theoria,	61,	pp.	182–97. --1997a:	The	Human	Animal.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. --1997b:	'Relativism	and	Persistence'.	Philosophical	Studies,	88,	pp.	141–62. --2002:	'Thinking	Animals	and	the	Reference	of	'I''.	Philosophical	Topics,	30,	pp.	189– 207. --2007:	What	Are	We?.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. Parfit,	Derek	1984:	Reasons	and	Persons.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. --2012:	'We	Are	Not	Human	Beings'.	Philosophy,	87,	pp.	5–28. Parret,	Herman	and	Jacques	Bouveresse	1981	(eds):	Meaning	and	Understanding.	New York:	de	Gruyter. Perry,	John	1977:	'Frege	on	Demonstratives'.	Philosophical	Review,	86:	474–97. --1979:	'The	Problem	of	the	Essential	Indexical'.	Noûs,	13,	pp.	3–21. --1997:	'Indexicals	and	Demonstratives'.	In	Hale	and	Wright	1997,	pp.	586–612. Petrus,	Klaus	(ed)	2003:	On	Human	Persons.	Frankfurt:	Ontos. Recanati,	François	2001:	'Are	'here'	and	'now'	indexicals?'.	Texte,	127/8,	pp.	115–27. Reimer,	Marga	1991:	'Demonstratives,	Demonstrations,	and	Demonstrata'.	Philosophical Studies,	63,	pp.	187–202. Robinson, Howard 2006: 'Personal Identity, the Self and Time', pp. Batthyany and Elitzur,	pp.	245–67. Rorty, Amelie	O. (ed) 1976:	The Identities of Persons. Berkeley and LA:	University of California	Press. Rovane,	Carol	1998:	The	Bounds	of	Agency.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press. Schwarz,	Wolfgang 2014: 'Against	Magnetism'.	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92, pp.	17–36. Shoemaker, Sydney	1999: 'Self, body, and coincidence'.	Proceedings of the	Aristotelian Society,	supp.	vol.	73:	287–306. Sidelle, Alan 1999: 'On the Prospects for a Theory of Personal Identity'.	Philosophical Topics,	26,	pp.	351–72. Sider, Theodore 2001a: 'Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis'.	Philosophical	Perspectives,	15,	pp.	189–209. --2001b: 'Maximality and Intrinsic Properties'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	63,	pp.	357–64. --2003: 'Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience'. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research,	66,	pp.	139–49. --2011:	Writing	the	Book	of	the	World.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Snowdon,	Paul	F.	1990:	'Persons,	Animals,	and	Ourselves'.	In	Gill	1990,	pp.	83–107. Sutton, Catherine S. 2014: 'The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem'.	Philosophical	Quarterly,	64,	pp.	619–39. 23 Unger,	Peter	1980:	'The	Problem	of	the	Many'.	Midwest	Studies	in	Philosophy,	5,	pp.	411– 67. --1990:	Identity,	Consciousness,	and	Value.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. van Inwagen, Peter 1981: 'The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts'. Pacific Philosophical	Quarterly,	62,	pp.	123–37. --1990:	Material	Beings.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press. van Inwagen,	Peter	and	Dean	W.	Zimmerman	(eds)	2007:	Persons:	Human	and	Divine. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Weatherson, Brian 2013: 'The Role of Naturalness in Lewis's Theory of Meaning'. Journal	for	the	History	of	Analytical	Philosophy	1	(10). Williams,	J.R.G.	2013:	'Part-Intrinsicality'.	Noûs,	47,	pp.	431–52. Zimmerman,	Dean	W.	2003a,	'Material	People'.	In	Zimmerman	2003b,	pp.	491-526. Zimmerman,	Dean	W.	(ed)	2003b:	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Metaphysics.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press.